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Abstract
This article seeks to explore the dynamics of region construction in East 
Asia, through both formal regional institutions and informal regionaliza-
tion processes. Regionalism, particularly in Southeast and East Asia, is often 
explained as a formal regionalist project. ASEAN serves as a prime example 
but many other intra-regional processes, such as the ASEAN plus Three, the 
East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, are also cases in point. 
These processes, representing state actors, do not necessarily work in autono-
mous spaces and discrete spheres, but rather interact with non-state entities 
through multi-level networking. This networking provides opportunities for 
the development of either 'positive' or 'negative' regionalism. As such, this 
article looks at the interplay of cross-level actor-networks and how they affect 
the direction and scope of regionalization in East Asia. It aims to show the 
dynamic interplay of multiple regional actors that can consciously or uncon-
sciously contribute to the strengthening or weakening of region construction. 
Keywords: ASEAN, East Asian regionalism, actor-networks, informal regionalization, 
regional cooperation
Introduction
Regionalism is often explained as a formal regionalist project led by a 
group of state actors who share certain common norms, values and goals. 
In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
serves as a good example of a progressive regional cooperation structure, 
while various other frameworks such as the ASEAN plus Three (APT), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) 
exist at the larger East Asia level.1 
Although these projects are intergovernmental and therefore mainly 
led by state actors, there is a dynamic interaction between state and non-
state actors that may well determine the depth and speed of regional 
activities in fostering closer integration. In this article, the various levels 
of state and non-state structures are transcended in order to provide a 
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fuller explanation of the region's dynamics. This is based on the premise 
that states and societies do not act in autonomous spaces and discrete 
spheres but are in constant interaction through social networks, where 
each can inﬂuence the others, both constructively and unsupportively. 
In other words, regionalism and regionalization can be mutually rein-
forcing (positive) but also contradictory (negative). Positive regionalism 
contributes to region construction while negative regionalism could 
lead to deconstruction.
In order to analyse the interactive dynamics of regionalism and re-
gionalization,2 the 'formal' (political) region, as represented by state-led 
initiatives, and the 'informal' (economic) region, involving the role of 
non-state actors in region building, are carefully considered. The purpose 
of connecting the formal sphere to the informal domain is to enable the 
various issues pertaining to region construction and their effects on the 
level of 'region-ness' to be identiﬁed and observed (Hettne 1999). 
This article looks at the interplay of cross-level actor-networks and 
how they affect the direction and scope of East Asian regionalism. 
Following constructivist thinking, it assumes that a region cannot be 
taken as a priori but is socially constructed and would therefore involve 
intersubjective interactions and understandings among regional actors 
(Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999). The article is divided into four sections. The 
ﬁrst section provides an explanation of cross-level actor-networks. The 
second section discusses and analyses the policies of political actors and 
the industrial preferences of the business sector. The evolving structure 
of free trade agreements in the region and the interests of corporate/
ﬁrm actors are then examined in the third section, and the ﬁnal section 
deliberates the role of regional epistemic communities in inﬂuencing 
the formation of policies pertaining to regionalist projects.
Cross-level Actor-networks
The process of region building involves multiple levels of actors coming 
together in networks, anchored in various historical settings. In East 
Asia, states, markets and epistemic groups constitute the three levels of 
government, business and academia that engage in activities of regional 
content. Business ﬁrms that are transnational or multinational in nature 
have regional concerns and often lobby governments through their trade 
associations to affect more favourable economic policies. Epistemic 
communities consist of close working relationships between scholars or 
researchers and policymakers (see Haas 1992). They are often referred to 
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as 'track 1.5' or more commonly as 'track 2', in contrast to governments 
representing the ofﬁcial diplomatic channel, which is 'track 1'. The close 
relationship between track 1 and track 2 is reﬂected in the work of track 
2 practitioners that involves policy recommendations in speciﬁc areas, 
such as economy and security. It is not uncommon to ﬁnd retired or 
ex-government ofﬁcials taking up positions in universities and research 
institutions and becoming part of the track 2 setting. 
External actors occupy an additional level where they may inﬂuence 
regional efforts directly or indirectly, such as the role of the United 
States in the European Union's history, and the US, international ﬁnan-
cial institutions and EU in the history of the APT. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), private citizens and even terrorist groups form 
further levels. While civic groups play important roles in more advanced 
forms of regionalism like the EU, their role in East Asia is still limited 
due to the weak development of civil societies. For the purpose of this 
study, the discussion focuses on three core actors – state, business and 
epistemic communities.
Industrial Preferences and ASEAN Policy
ASEAN was originally established as a security organization, where 
members sought to work together to build mutual trust and to calm 
regional discontent. Prior to the early 1990s, when the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
were proposed and economic integration was taken more seriously, 
economic cooperation between member countries was fairly minimal. 
Although member countries did propose and form a number of coop-
erative schemes, such as the Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA) 
and the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) in 1977, ASEAN Industrial 
Complementation (AIC) in 1981, ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) 
in 1983 and the Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) in 1988, they 
all produced poor results with the exception of the BBC. 
These schemes were designed to increase intra-trade and utilize the 
PTA. The problem with the PTA was that it included a long list of prod-
ucts that had little effect on the nature of regional trade. Not only did 
it contain items like snowploughs and nuclear power plants that were 
insigniﬁcant to trade, it also covered less than one per cent of intra-trade 
out of almost 16,000 products listed by 1990 (Narine 2002: 28). Projects 
under the AIPs, AIC and AIJV either failed and became inconsequential 
or yielded only partial effects due to factors ranging from lack of commit-
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ment from some member states and/or private sectors, to difﬁculties in 
approving and implementing them (Narine 2002: 28-29; Tongzon 1998: 
58-64). As then Malaysian Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim mentioned 
in a 1992 speech: 'various mechanisms including preferential trading 
arrangements and the ASEAN industrial complementation scheme 
have not been successful… Tariff concessions on thousands of items 
were made but this did not contribute signiﬁcantly to the growth in 
intra-regional trade' (Anwar 1992). Obviously, there was still a lack of 
regional economic awareness as the organization continued to function 
largely for security purposes. National interest, namely prioritizing 
national projects over regional ones, and outward-oriented economic 
systems such as the 'look east' policies of Malaysia and Singapore but-
tressed by massive foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂow from outside 
the region beginning in the mid-1980s had, one way or another, kept 
intra-ASEAN trade small. Intra-trade as a percentage of total exports in 
1980 was 17.4 per cent and by 1990 it had only managed a 1.6 per cent 
increase (UNCTAD 2004: 34-35). 
Japanese FDI inﬂow into Southeast Asia, particularly since mid-1980s 
due to the effect of endaka (high value Yen), contributed greatly to the 
industrialization process of ASEAN countries (especially the ASEAN-
5). More liberalized FDI regime policies adopted or enacted by ASEAN 
countries after the 1985 recession provided incentives to foreign ﬁrms 
and investors, although certain conditions or restrictions were applied. 
Malaysia, for example, allowed majority foreign ownership in manufac-
turing under the 1986 Promotion of Investments Act if more than half of 
production was exported. The Philippines's 1987 Omnibus Investment 
Code and the 1991 Foreign Investment Act liberalized the FDI regime 
while imposing certain requirements (see Nesadurai 2003: 101-105). 
Such liberalization efforts, though imperfect, enabled foreign investors 
to enter or further consolidate their presence in the region.
In the automotive industry, for example, Japanese automakers had 
established their presence as early as the 1960s by setting up manufactur-
ing or assembly plants in the ASEAN-4 as part of the fulﬁlment of local 
content regulations. Their activities were further expanded in the 1980s. 
For instance, Mitsubishi's ﬁrst assembly plant was established in the 
Philippines in 1963 and later expanded into Malaysia (joint venture with 
Proton in 1982), Indonesia (1985) and Thailand (joint venture, 1987).3 
Japanese automakers' early adventure into the ASEAN region explains 
their substantial market share in the region. However, their ability to do 
so by achieving economies of scale was related to an important ASEAN 
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policy, namely the BBC scheme. The scheme illustrates the cross-level 
interaction between state and business actors. 
The Brand-to-Brand Complementation and ASEAN 
Industrial Cooperation Schemes
Prior to the Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC), the ASEAN Au-
tomotive Federation (AAF) had in 1976 proposed projects involving 
the production and distribution of automotive parts in Southeast Asia 
(Narine 2002: 28). When the ASEAN Industrial Complementation was 
established, the plan was to produce an 'ASEAN car' by complement-
ing parts among member states. It was meant to be a government-led 
initiative whereby the ASEAN governments would negotiate amongst 
themselves to decide which processes should be placed in which country. 
Conﬁrming the problem of relative gain, this approach failed miserably 
due to conﬂicts over who would receive higher value-added processes 
(Akrasanee and Stifel 1993). The existence and dominance of foreign 
automakers further complicated matters and became a source of conﬂict. 
More notably, Japanese automakers were not enthusiastic at all. There 
was trepidation that local production of auto parts could 'cut into the 
proﬁts the Japanese ﬁrms derived from the export of CKD [Complete 
Knock Down] kits' (Machado 1992: 190). 
However, the situation began to change in the second half of the 1980s. 
Rapid appreciation of the Yen naturally increased the costs of imported 
CKD kits. At the same time, ASEAN was becoming more assertive in 
demanding accelerated localization. Mitsubishi was the ﬁrst automaker 
to broach the idea of a BBC with ASEAN (through the Committee on 
Industry, Minerals and Energy, or COIME) in 1987.4 The BBC would 
allow Mitsubishi to further consolidate its operations in the ASEAN-4 
with the complementary production of parts and components. To pro-
duce components cheaply, they had to be made in sufﬁcient volumes 
and, considering the small domestic market size of individual countries, 
the BBC would be useful in achieving economies of scale and reducing 
costs through tariff reduction (a minimum of 50 per cent margin of tariff 
preference). Moreover, local content accreditation was to be granted 
under the scheme, which would allow auto ﬁrms to export vehicles 
produced in ASEAN to Western markets under the Generalised System 
of Preference (GSP) quotas (Machado 1992: 190-191). Once established, 
Mitsubishi was the ﬁrst to be granted approval in March 1989; other 
automakers later followed suit, Toyota in November 1989 and Nissan 
_________________________________________________________________________17
________________________________________________________ Region Construction
in May 1990. Participation by various auto multinational corporations 
(MNCs) made the scheme relatively successful when compared to 
previous schemes.
The BBC was a reconstituted version of the AIC and thus exhibited 
similarities such as concern with the production and exchange of auto 
parts and components. One difference is that, unlike the AIC that 
required at least four member countries' participation, the BBC only 
required two.5 There were also other clear differences between the two. 
The AIC was meant to be a regionalist initiative by state actors aimed at 
increasing intra-trade through the production of a regional 'car' concept. 
The BBC, on the other hand, was a non-state initiative where the process 
of regionalization through brand complementation rested in the hands 
of business actors. Although the application for BBC still required ap-
proval from the participating countries, the organization and control 
of regional production rested squarely with individual ﬁrms. Thus, the 
BBC serves to facilitate economic regionalization. 
While automakers from Japan weren't the only ones to utilize the 
scheme, their early participation beneﬁted them in reducing costs 
and consolidating operations ahead of their rivals. Therefore, it was 
unwelcome news when ASEAN decided to scrap the BBC plan in 
April 1995 on the grounds that the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) would provide sufﬁcient incentives for all investors 
(Yoshimatsu 2002: 131).6 They lobbied their own government and 
through the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), 
opposed the scrapping of the scheme (Yoshimatsu 2002: 131-132). At 
the 27th ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) meeting in September 
1995, it was agreed that the BBC scheme would continue to function 
until a new scheme was approved. The BBC and AIJV were replaced 
by the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme when it came 
into effect in November 1996. 
Unlike the BBC, AICO is not limited to auto assemblers but open to 
any manufacturing ﬁrms that satisﬁes the agreement's criteria – to be 
operating in an ASEAN country, having a minimum 30 per cent national 
equity, and undertaking resource sharing, industrial complementation 
or industrial cooperation activities.7 Furthermore, it is based on the 
CEPT, where approved ﬁrms enjoy immediate preferential tariff rates 
of zero to ﬁve per cent ahead of the ﬁnal CEPT rate. This bode well for 
foreign manufacturers eager to consolidate their ASEAN operations. 
However, the initial phase of the scheme was bogged down by prob-
lems in processing applications and other bureaucratic complexities 
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due to the different stances taken by participating countries. Some, like 
Thailand and the Philippines, were liberal while others, like Indonesia, 
were more cautious; since the scheme required approval from at least 
two participating members, the approval rate was low. Only 14 ap-
provals were made over the ﬁrst two years from 1996 to 1998 (ASEAN 
Secretariat 1998a). 
The 30 per cent national equity clause also became a problem for 
foreign ﬁrms using the AICO scheme. As Yoshimatsu noted,
[a]lthough overall objectives of the AICO were to promote industrial 
complementation and to stimulate both intra-regional trade and inward 
investment, the ASEAN states sought to utilise the scheme as a means to 
promote the interest of their local enterprises and economies, and imposed 
regulations for this objective. (2002: 133) 
This naturally impeded the participation of foreign MNCs, which 
had established themselves in the ASEAN region to take advantage 
of local governments' investment incentives that allowed for high for-
eign ownership shares. Since foreign ﬁrms' participation is central to 
the AICO, it was agreed that the national equity requirement could be 
waived, providing that the proposing ﬁrm meets other criteria imposed 
by the participating country. The criteria for waiver, which were to be 
decided by individual countries, and the lack of uniformity, no doubt 
complicated matters and slowed the application process.   
The onslaught of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis gave recognition to the 
need to accelerate the AICO as part of the regional economic integra-
tion process. Several changes were introduced, such as the relaxation 
of the eligibility criteria to allow for pre-investment AICO approval 
that would grant companies planning to invest in the region the right 
to apply for AICO status and unconditional waiver of the 30 per cent 
national equity requirement. These changes removed critical barriers 
and served as incentives to foreign ﬁrms' participation. Furthermore, 
intra-ﬁrm AICO arrangement has been permitted since 1999 in response 
to private sector demands. In 2004, an amendment was made to the 
AICO agreement to set the tariff rate at zero per cent for six countries 
– Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore – and 
tariff bands for the remaining four at zero to ﬁve per cent (Myanmar 
and Vietnam), zero to one per cent (the Philippines) and zero to three 
per cent (Thailand). The main objective was to maintain the relevance 
of AICO ahead of the CEPT. This is in light of the 2003 amendment to 
the CEPT agreement that set the ﬁnal CEPT rate of 0 per cent by 2010 
for the original six members and 2015 for the Indochinese four. 
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Deregulation brought about by the crisis and greater awareness 
among member governments, coupled with the lobbying activities of 
the private sector through the Working Group on Industrial Coopera-
tion (WGIC) and other informal channels, have led to an increase in 
applications and subsequent approvals.8 Japanese auto ﬁrms such as 
Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi and Denso made up the majority 
of approved applicants. The AICO generated greater attention in the 
automobile industry than the electronics sector (about four per cent). One 
reason for the lack of enthusiasm in the latter, according to Yoshimatsu 
(2002: 143), was the favourable policies of low import tariffs adopted 
by local governments and the perception that the CEPT would cover 
most electronic products – compared with the high tariffs endured by 
foreign auto ﬁrms because of the need for local governments to safeguard 
their national industries. Furthermore, the automotive sector is highly 
competitive and requires many more components for production than 
electronics. The manufacturing of a printer, for example, may require 
about 600 parts, but a car could require up to 25,000 parts. The outcome 
has been an increased concentration of automotive part exchanges and 
procurement within the ASEAN region, with Thailand turning into the 
'Detroit of the East'. 
The AICO scheme captures the process of cross-level actor interaction 
by demonstrating the elements of reinforcement and contradiction be-
tween state-led regionalism and informal economic regionalization. The 
ASEAN governments' decision to insert the 30 per cent equity clause and 
open the scheme to all manufacturing sectors reﬂected the contention be-
tween protecting national interests through the imposition of regulations 
and the need to enhance economic regionalization through the participa-
tion of foreign ﬁrms. In addition, perception differences existed between 
the intention of state actors to move beyond the BBC and involve other 
manufacturing sectors, and the utilization of AICO by mainly automo-
tive ﬁrm actors that viewed it as a continued extension of the previous 
BBC. The unconditional waiver of the national equity requirement helped 
bridge the differences between formal regionalism and informal region-
alization. The reinforcement element, therefore, lies in the former playing 
a facilitation role rather than affecting control of the latter. 
The ASEAN Investment Area Plan
The ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) forms yet another regionalist initia-
tive that is in close proximity to the AFTA and AICO. As the latter two 
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aim to create a business environment conducive to ﬁrms' activities, the 
former seeks to complement these by eliminating intra-regional barriers 
to investment and streamlining investment rules to increase the ﬂow of 
investment from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources. It comes at a 
time when ASEAN faces stiff competition for foreign direct investment 
from neighbouring countries, particularly China, and the effects of the 
Asian crisis. The idea was to generate a favourable regional investment 
climate and to do so naturally requires cooperation and coordination 
between member countries in promoting the region as a lucrative in-
vestment area.
The agreement to set up an AIA was made at the 5th ASEAN Sum-
mit in Bangkok in 1995. It was then deliberated at the meetings of the 
ASEAN Heads of Investment Agencies (AHIA) for several years before 
a Framework Agreement on the AIA was agreed upon in October 1998. 
The framework stipulates that member economies would immediately 
open the manufacturing sector to ASEAN investors by granting them 
national treatment but would allow exemptions through a Temporary 
Exclusion List (TEL) and a Sensitive List (SL).9 The Framework also es-
tablishes a ministerial-level AIA Council to oversee the implementation 
and review of the agreement with support from the AHIA. The 1998 
AIA agreement is a step up from the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments where the focus was solely on investment 
by ASEAN nationals. 
Due to an investment slump caused by the Asian crisis, short-term 
measures were adopted at the 1998 ASEAN Summit in Hanoi as part of 
a collective effort to boost investment inﬂow. Six areas of privileges, cov-
ering everything from ﬁscal incentives to employment, were extended 
to all investors in the manufacturing sector for a period from January 
1999 to December 2000. The two most signiﬁcant privileges were the 
100 per cent foreign equity ownership and domestic market access.10 
Based on the decision of the ﬁrst AIA Council meeting in March 1999 
to widen the AIA coverage, a new protocol was established in 2001 to 
cover agriculture, ﬁsheries, forestry and mining and quarrying sectors. 
The AIA Council at their fourth meeting agreed to accelerate full AIA 
realisation for foreign investors from 2020 to 2010.11 This meant that 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors would enjoy the full beneﬁts of the 
AIA simultaneously in 2010 for all sectors covered by the AIA, except 
manufacturing where ASEAN investors maintain the upper hand.12
The AIA's development provides an interesting picture of the relation-
ship between formal and informal processes of regionalism. Unlike the 
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BBC and AICO, which involved active private sector participation, the 
AIA is mainly a government initiative with implications for the private 
sector. Since one of the main purposes of the AIA is to increase invest-
ment inﬂow and intra-regional trade, thus aimed at prioritizing ASEAN 
stakeholders over external investors, the initial plan appeared to run 
contrary to the industrialization structure of member countries that are 
export-led and highly dependent on foreign sources of investment for 
economic recovery and growth. The AIA had not been beneﬁcial due 
to the ASEAN-foreign distinction and should instead open up by giv-
ing national treatment to all investors, irrespective of nationality if the 
intention is to increase investment ﬂow in the region.13 The reason for 
the distinction, however, is to protect the interest of local industries. 
Helen Nesadurai, on the other hand, argues that state actors have the 
intention of using the AIA as a 'developmental tool' to 'nurture domestic 
capital' and catalyse the formation of ASEAN-based MNCs within the 
grace period before fully opening up to foreign capital (2003: 112-115). 
It was to be a two-pronged approach, with the AIA centring on ASEAN 
investors and AFTA (including AICO) attracting foreign investors. Un-
fortunately, the intention of state actors to use the AIA to nurture and de-
velop ASEAN conglomerates has not been backed up by concrete plans. 
This is because the AIA was never meant to be a collective state-driven 
mission. Important initiatives, such as increasing the transparency of 
investment rules and policies, simplifying procedures for applications 
and approvals, eliminating restrictive investment measures like rules on 
licensing conditions and access to domestic ﬁnance, and procedures to 
open up industries and extend national treatment are to be undertaken 
unilaterally at the discretion of the individual countries, while collective 
efforts cover less important matters such as establishing databases on 
investment information and organizing investment seminars, fora and 
workshops for the business sector. 
The AIA framework also made clear that 'the business sector has 
a larger role in the cooperation efforts in relation to investments and 
related activities in ASEAN' (ASEAN Secretariat 1998c: 4). Thus, even 
though there is a collective conscious desire among state actors to affect 
the regionalisation process in a particular way, the AIA agreement is 
ultimately designed to facilitate private sector activities. As Malaysia's 
former Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had emphasized at 
the 2004 ASEAN Business Investment Summit that:
[t]he governments can only create the enabling business environment but 
it is the private sector which should take the lead in translating them into 
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business opportunities… The governments will act as facilitators to minimise 
legal and procedural obstacles to enable more efﬁcient movements of the 
factors of production. (Badawi 2004)
The rescheduling and subsequent removal of the ASEAN-foreign 
distinction in giving national treatment and domestic access reduces con-
ﬂicting elements of state and non-state interests and signiﬁes a change 
from negative to positive regionalism. Notably, the Asian crisis and the 
unsettling concerns of foreign investors contributed to the realisation of 
the need for foreign investments and the ensuing policy change. Invest-
ment data had clearly shown that only 12.2 per cent of foreign direct 
investments to ASEAN-10 was intra-ASEAN in 1998 and that ﬁgure had 
dropped to 10.2 per cent in 2003, while the latest 2013 data showed a 
slight increase, but still low at 17.4 per cent (ASEAN Secretariat 2004; 
ASEAN Secretariat 2014).14 Foreign investors have continued to play a 
major role in the region's economic development. 
In conclusion, the BBC, AICO and AIA initiatives as part of the AFTA-
plus programmes are similar to the CEPT, which aims to liberalize trade 
and investment policies and facilitate economic regionalization. They 
are not so much aimed at promoting intra-trade ﬂow as enhancing the 
region's competitiveness and thus its attractiveness in luring foreign 
investments (Reyes 2005).15 These initiatives are part of the regional-
ist project of state actors intended to achieve the objective of creating 
a single production base and an integrated consumer market by the 
end of 2015. There is thus a mutual reinforcement between ASEAN's 
goal of creating an open market and the consolidation of ﬁrms' activi-
ties into a complex web of regional production networks, as well as 
the embedding of the region into the wider global production chain. 
Contradictions between state notions of regionalism and ﬁrm interest 
of regionalization have not been injurious to region construction with 
member states acknowledging their roles as facilitators. However, this 
does not exempt the imposition of certain stopgap measures should the 
forces of globalization overwhelms national considerations. 
Free Trade Agreement Policy and Business Interests
Free trade agreement (FTA) proliferation, which once sparked debates 
on its virtue with governments taking a precautious approach, has 
become such a common phenomenon that there is now less debate 
about the pros and cons of FTAs among governments than about how 
fast they are concluded and put into force. There is a sense of urgency, 
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as if state actors are engaged in a competitive race to see who will 
garner the most number of FTAs. Calling them 'do-it-quick' agree-
ments, the late Nordin Sopiee pointed out that states are wrapping 
up bilateral agreements in as little as two or three years (2004: 29). 
Some, like the Thailand-Australia FTA, only took a year to conclude. 
Certain ASEAN states, like Malaysia and Thailand, were strong pro-
ponents of AFTA but began to change their policy stances in favour of 
bilateral trade agreements due to domestic and global changes generally 
and the fear of being left out by Singapore's unilateral decision to pursue 
bilateralism in particular (Sopiee 2004: 30). This shift in approach soon 
saw other member states, such as Brunei, Philippines and Indonesia, 
joining the race. Although FTA negotiations mainly involve state actors, 
consultations with non-state actors are deemed important and necessary. 
The purpose of FTA is, after all, to facilitate trade, reduce transaction 
costs and augment business operations for ﬁrms. A survey of Japanese 
ﬁrms, mostly in the manufacturing sector, conducted by JETRO indeed 
found that companies in general are supportive of FTAs, with 69 per cent 
of those with overseas bases thinking that trade agreements will help 
to expand their business opportunities and increase sales or improve 
proﬁts (Kajita 2004: 8). 
In reality, however, FTAs affect economic sectors in various ways. 
Trade liberalization brings in new market players that could easily 
overwhelm unprepared domestic ﬁrms. Extensive planning and inten-
sive coordination between the various governmental departments and 
agencies, and with various business organizations, interest groups, civic 
bodies and the general public are indispensable in order to maximise 
the net gain or to minimize the net loss associated with free trade. Such 
processes are undertaken to varying degrees in most developed nations 
but less so in developing countries. As Tommy Koh, the chief negotiator 
for the US-Singapore FTA (USSFTA), observed: 
[W]hen you negotiate with the US, you have no choice but to negotiate not 
only with the administration but also with the United States Congress, US 
business and industry and the civil society… [a] top-down approach can 
work in Singapore but it cannot work in the US. Prime Minister Goh had the 
power to conclude an FTA with the US without having to consult Parliament, 
business and industry and the civil society. President Clinton did not have 
such power (2004: 10-11). 
Koh's informed opinion resonates well for most ASEAN govern-
ments, whereby the negotiation process not only rests in the hands of 
trade negotiators alone, but is largely carried out without sufﬁcient 
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input from the business and civil sectors. Even if feedback is solicited, 
it is often not pervasive, but limited to feedback from selected govern-
ment-linked companies or certain leading sectors of the economy. The 
Board of Trade and the Federation of Thai Industries that represent 
private business operators in Thailand have expressed their discontent 
over their government's FTA approach, which fails to include wider 
public participation in the negotiation process (Bangkok Post 2005).16 
FTA Watch Group (2004),17 a Thai NGO, wrote an open letter in late 2004 
alleging that the Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was not transparent 
and violated the Thai Constitution for not involving civic groups in the 
decision-making process and for failing to produce the ofﬁcial agree-
ment in the Thai language. The TAFTA was also strongly protested by 
the local dairy producers association for fear of Australian dairy prod-
ucts ﬂooding the Thai market (Na Thalang 2004).18 In the Philippines, 
the Stop the New Round (SNR) Coalition and the Fair Trade Alliance 
group have been vocal in their opposition to the government's pursuit 
of bilateral free trade agreements, arguing that they lack transparency 
and civil participation (Cahiles-Magkilat 2005).19 The on-going Trans-
Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) negotiation process involving several ASEAN 
countries has likewise been harshly criticized for being opaque and 
keeping civic groups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the 
dark (see Kelsey 2010). 
The lack of manpower and resources, the need to maintain secrecy 
and being pressed for time to conclude trade pacts drastically reduces 
states' ability to engage in proper in-depth sectoral analysis and rig-
orous consultations with diverse layers of actors prior to and during 
the negotiation period. Not wanting to cease the opportunity to use 
FTAs as a means to generate economic growth, states are seen to take 
the approach of concluding an agreement ﬁrst and solving whatever 
problems arise later. This would be acceptable if governments had the 
capacity and political will to anticipate in advance and put up safety 
nets, which has unfortunately been made considerably more difﬁcult 
by the 'noodle bowl' effect and the absence of impact studies. Whether 
deliberate or otherwise, the lack of cross-actor level interaction may cost 
certain industrial players and professionals such as architects, lawyers, 
accountants and engineers to brace for impact as free competition and 
the crowding out of certain industries or sectors become inevitable 
(Siripunyawit 2005).20 In the USSFTA, for example, Singapore's textile 
and garment industry will have to restructure by sourcing yarn from 
the US as part of the rules of origins, in order to capitalize on the FTA, 
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which would add costs compared with sourcing from China or other 
neighbouring countries. 
The discrepancy between state-promoted bilateralism and economic 
regionalization based on division of labour and regional production 
networks demonstrates negative regionalism that needs to be ratiﬁed 
through region-wide FTA consolidation and overcoming the noodle-
bowl effect. Economic bilateralism has the potential to create complica-
tions and affect region-building, since it is highly nationalistic and has 
the potential to go against the notion of natural economic zones or 'region 
states' (see Ohmae 1995). It stands to disrupt the distribution of manu-
facturing activities in the region, add cumbersome administrative costs 
to ﬁrms and alter the complimentary pattern of intra-regional trade due 
to uneven competition. Examples, such as the decision of the USSFTA 
to extend the juridical reach to include two Indonesian islands, Batam 
and Bintan, where parts and components are extensively sourced in 
order for Singapore to fulﬁl the local content rules and take advantage 
of the FTA, and the role of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Indus-
try of Japan to promote the concept of accumulative origin in the case of 
Japan and ASEAN, as part of the effort to create an East Asian business 
zone, highlight efforts to bridge the gap and foster positive regionalism 
(METI 2003: 302-305).
In conclusion, states' pursuit of bilateral trade pacts and the interests of 
corporate ﬁrms produce mixed effects. There are elements of reinforce-
ment and contradiction between the formal and the informal spheres. 
It is reinforcing when state efforts to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barri-
ers, improve investment criteria and enhance the movement of people 
contribute to smoother business operations. Here, FTA policy takes on 
the role of effective facilitator. However, it is contradictory when the 
policy runs counter to the structure and trend of integrated cross-bor-
der production and regional division of labour. If FTAs are designed to 
beneﬁt trade, then it cannot be the sole responsibility of governments 
without the active participation of and input from those who stand to 
be affected. It is when FTAs serve political or strategic considerations, 
such as boosting security alliances or regulating the pace of market 
liberalization, that contradiction arises.
Epistemic Communities' Role and Policy Formation
Epistemic communities, or 'epistemic policy actors' as Cesar de Prado 
Yepes (2003) calls them, are professional groups largely made up of 
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academic experts who are closely involved in policy-related works 
within a certain issue or spatial area (see also Higgott 1994). Some take 
on global issues in areas such as security or economics and some, if not 
most, are involved in multiple issues. They are represented by various 
think tanks that form networks through interaction at the local, regional 
and international echelons. Interestingly, think tank networks are more 
noticeable at the regional than the international level. This is because 
regional networks have a smaller number of actors and the ability to 
engineer collective action and common identity makes them relatively 
efﬁcient, compared with international networks that are more diffuse 
in nature (Stone 2000: 35-36). 
In the East Asian context, two broad regional networks that are 
dedicated to regional developmental issues are the ASEAN Institutes 
of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Network 
of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT).21 The ASEAN-ISIS (hereafter re-
ferred to as AI) is a network made up of a limited group of institutions 
in ASEAN countries, which was ofﬁcially launched in June 1988. Since 
then, the membership of AI has expanded along with the enlargement 
of ASEAN. At present, there are ten institutions, one from each member 
country.22 The AI is categorized as an NGO, with a secretariat based 
in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia, 
which has been instrumental in establishing the AI. Although considered 
an NGO with independent research mechanisms, members of the AI 
have strong informal linkages with their respective governments. The 
linkage allows the AI to inﬂuence ASEAN's decision-making processes 
through policy recommendations. Much of the AI's agenda is centred 
on regional security issues and crisis prevention. Despite its name, its 
activities are not limited to the Southeast Asian region, but cover a wider 
area that spans the Asia Paciﬁc, although its concerns are primarily 
focused on ASEAN's wellbeing. 
In the 1980s, the AI worked to foster a common identity on regional 
security cooperation inspired by the successful process of the Confer-
ence for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The initiation of an 
annual conference called the Asia-Paciﬁc Roundtable (APR) in 1987 by 
ISIS Malaysia became the main vehicle for discussions and exchanges of 
views among policymakers, defence and intelligence experts, diplomats, 
research institute representatives and academics from some twenty 
countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.23 In the ﬁrst APR conference, ISIS 
Malaysia had called for the establishment of a forum for multilateral 
security dialogue. It was considered to be a prerequisite to conﬂict re-
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duction, arms control and conﬁdence building measures, which were 
issues of concern. 
As the momentum built up, AI issued a memorandum in 1991 
containing a proposal on the establishment of an Asia Paciﬁc Political 
Dialogue for the consideration of the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore 
in 1992 (ASEAN-ISIS 1991). The discourse would follow the annual 
ASEAN PMC meetings so that ASEAN could take the leading role in 
the proposed security dialogue.24 This was agreed by the summit lead-
ers, as they noted the need to intensify 'external dialogues in political 
and security matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Confer-
ences (PMC)' (ASEAN Secretariat 1992). The leaders' approval paved 
the way for a decision made at the 26th AMM in July 1993 to establish 
an 'ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)' and acknowledged AI's relentless 
efforts in promoting a multilateral security framework (ASEAN Secre-
tariat 1993). Thus, the ﬁrst ARF took place in Bangkok in 1994 as part 
of the annual AMM-PMC and has since become an annual event. AI 
continues to play a role by feeding ideas to the ASEAN Senior Ofﬁcial 
Meeting (SOM) that was created to prepare and implement ARF deci-
sions (Yepes 2003: 6).25 
Apart from its inﬂuential role in the ARF, AI has also made great 
efforts in lobbying Asian governments to accede to the TAC and in 
pushing for the realization of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ) which was ﬁnally launched at the 5th ASEAN Sum-
mit in 1995. The close relationship and signiﬁcance of AI in cooperation 
with ASEAN has been clearly acknowledged in the joint communiqués 
of the AMM. Nevertheless, there have been issues and cases where AI 
has not been successful in pushing its agenda, such as Myanmar's ac-
cession, nuclear power states' participation in SEANWFZ, Indonesian 
forest ﬁres and ﬁnding solutions to managing potential conﬂicts in the 
South China Sea (Ruland 2002). 
While AI is often discussed in a political and security context in the 
literature, it also contributes on economic matters pertaining to ASEAN's 
economic integration agenda. In line with former Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong's proposal for an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at 
the 1992 ASEAN Summit, AI under the leadership of the late Hadi Soe-
sastro came up with a proposal on the AEC, titled 'Towards an ASEAN 
Economic Community'. The AI paper recommended a 'common market 
minus' approach that calls for the harmonization of external tariffs and 
free mobility of labour and capital (ASEAN-ISIS 2003). Meanwhile, the 
Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), headed 
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by Denis Hew, made their own concept paper on the AEC that differs 
from AI's proposal in recommending an 'FTA-plus' approach consist-
ing of a zero-tariff AFTA and some elements of a common market (free 
movement of capital and labour) (ISEAS 2003). ISEAS rightfully argues 
that a customs union requiring the setting up of common external tar-
iffs would be extremely difﬁcult and highly unlikely due to member 
countries' differing economic levels (Hew and Soesastro 2003; Hew and 
Sen 2004). The two papers, meant to provide ideas on the character of 
the AEC, were taken into consideration by the High Level Task Force 
(HLTF) on ASEAN Economic Integration.26 According to Denis Hew, 
the ISEAS paper focuses on achieving an AEC by 2020 as the end goal, 
while the AI paper seeks to declare the AEC as a common market by 
2020 – but with a big negative list that would eventually stretch beyond 
2020 and is therefore considered more ambitious.27 The HLTF's own 
recommendations, annexed to the Bali Concord II, did not clearly state 
their stance on the two papers but mentioned that the AEC should be the 
end goal of economic integration by 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat 2003a; see 
also ASEAN Secretariat 2003b). They appear to favour an incremental 
approach that builds on existing schemes as recommended by ISEAS.
However, ASEAN integration is not the only area of concern. ISIS 
Malaysia has been instrumental in promoting the East Asia Economic 
Caucus concept through various seminars and conferences. It is sup-
portive of Malaysia's intention to host the APT Secretariat. In 2003, as 
a 'farewell gift' to Mahathir who was stepping down from ofﬁce, ISIS 
Malaysia initiated the setting up of an East Asia Economic Centre to 
serve as a regional focal point for research on East Asia and became the 
organiser of the East Asia Congress (EAC), an annual conference that 
lasted from 2003 to 2009 and saw the gathering of participants from the 
public and private sectors, academic institutions and the media engaged 
in issues related to community building in the region. Apart from the 
EAC, AI collaborated with the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as co-sponsor 
of the annual Japan-ASEAN Dialogue that lasted from 2002 to 2009. It 
served as a platform for scholars and research institute representatives 
to hold talks on issues that affect ASEAN-Japan relations.
NEAT, on the other hand, was endorsed by the APT leaders and 
established in fulﬁlment of one of the short-term measures in the East 
Asia Study Group (EASG) report. As such, it is ofﬁcially recognized, 
which allows it to function as an important platform for track 2 diplo-
macy in support of the APT regionalist project. Anchored at the East 
Asian Studies Centre, China Foreign Affairs University, NEAT is co-
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ordinated by China. A country coordinator is assigned to the other 12 
member countries responsible for the coordination of their respective 
domestic think tanks/institutions. NEAT serves a signiﬁcant purpose 
not only by providing intellectual support to the APT framework, but 
to ultimately pool academic resources to ensure that the disparate think 
tanks and institutions that have until recently been focused on separate 
research agendas come together in unison and contemplate issues of 
concern in reaching a common regional objective. This helps to instil 
a sense of direction and belonging and reshape research focus from a 
narrow state interest to a wider regional perspective, inevitably giving 
rise to an epistemic community. Unnecessary overlap and duplication 
of work can be avoided through information exchanges and working 
groups, which should make policy research contributions (as a group 
effort) much more streamlined, credible and acceptable by the East 
Asian governments. 
NEAT's founding and ﬁrst annual conference was held in Beijing 
in September 2003. Attended by some 100 scholars, issues such as the 
establishment of a separate secretariat for the APT, the holding of the 
ﬁrst EAS, the upgrading of ﬁnancial cooperation and the structure 
of NEAT were discussed (NEAT 2003). At the second conference in 
Bangkok in August 2004, the participating members adopted a policy 
recommendations paper that was submitted to the APT Senior Ofﬁcial 
Meeting; it contained proposals on the idea of creating an East Asian 
Community (EAnC) based on the concept of the three pillars of the 
ASEAN Community, the setting up of EAFTA as a high priority, the 
doubling of the swap arrangements, the setting up of an expert group 
to study the feasibility of a regional monetary fund, the strengthening 
of institutionalization by convening the EAS and giving a greater role 
to the three Northeast Asian countries, and the offering of expertise to 
prepare a roadmap for the EAnC (NEAT 2004). 
Since then, NEAT has stepped up cooperation with country coor-
dinators gathered for a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2004 
and decided to set up six Working Groups (WGs) to carry out practical 
research.28 The reports of the WGs were submitted for deliberations 
to the third conference held in Tokyo in August 2005. At the end of 
the conference session, a list of policy recommendations was adopted 
for submission to the APT Senior Ofﬁcial Meeting before the 9th APT 
Summit in December calling for the APT, among others, to continue to 
play a major role in region building, to institutionalize energy policy 
cooperation along the lines of the International Energy Agency and to 
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narrow the development gap between countries as a prerequisite to 
promoting regional identity (NEAT 2005). 
The formation of NEAT has had an impact on the epistemic com-
munity in Japan, leading, for example, to the creation of the Council 
on East Asian Community (CEAC) in May 2004, eight months after the 
inauguration of NEAT. NEAT's signiﬁcance in inﬂuencing the reshap-
ing of Japan's epistemic community is reﬂected in the CEAC President 
Kenichi Ito's remarks:
It is true that until recently we, Japanese, tended to be more passive, if not 
indifferent, to the concept of an East Asian community… This passiveness 
of Japan's attitude toward the concept of an East Asian community until 
the recent past might have been explained partly by her reluctance to take 
an initiative in anything that might be associated with the memory of 'The 
Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' which was advocated by Japan during 
the Second World War. 
Having said that, however, I can say that such was the case only until 
yesterday. Today, joining with you in the 2nd Conference of NEAT, we 
are more determined to go along with you in the direction of the creation 
of an East Asian community… What has brought about the change of our 
attitude? Or, better to say, what has enlightened us? In my personal case, 
it was my experience to attend the 1st NEAT Conference held in Beijing 
last September. I saw there for the ﬁrst time in my life Asians coming from 
different countries speaking in one voice and working for one purpose. I 
was touched by the aspiration of the people assembled in that NEAT 
conference.
After returning home from Beijing, we, those who attended the conference, 
called on our countrymen to organise an all-Japan intellectual platform 
where we can deepen our understanding of the concept of an East Asian 
community by way of conducting research and promoting policy debates 
among ourselves (2004: 1-2.)29
Apart from heading the CEAC and GFJ, Kenichi Ito is also the presi-
dent and CEO of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) 
which served as the country coordinator of NEAT and the secretariat 
for the CEAC. Understood in this respect, the CEAC was established 
as a focal point for coordinating the various domestic think tanks, with 
the JFIR at the forefront of this development. The establishment of the 
CEAC would naturally require member think tanks to streamline their 
work by focusing on the promotion of East Asian-related policy research 
in line with the objectives of the CEAC. JFIR (2003), which is for the 
most part concerned with security issues including Japan's alliance with 
the US and Japan's position in world politics, came out with a policy 
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recommendation through its Policy Council titled 'Japan's Initiative 
for Economic Community in East Asia' after a year-long deliberation, 
listing 15 bold measures – among them the drafting of an Economic 
Community in East Asia (ECEA) Treaty in 2005 to be effective in 2007 
with a permanent executive body called the Organisation for East Asia 
to be set up, establishing a free trade area in East Asia centred on Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore, forming a customs union by 2015, and set-
ting up a common currency in 2025.30 
Eager to take a collective stance on what Japan's response to the idea 
of an EAnC should be, the CEAC came out with their ﬁrst policy report 
titled 'The State of the Concept of East Asian Community and Japan's 
Strategic Response thereto' in August 2005. More down to earth than 
JFIR's policy recommendations, the CEAC report noted that the forma-
tion of an EAnC should be related to three aspects of Japan's national 
interest – the improvement in the international security environment, 
the expansion of the global economy and respect for equality, freedom, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (CEAC 2005).31 Without 
setting deadlines, the report called for a step-by-step evolutionary ap-
proach, consisting of three phases to collectively promote economic 
integration. The ﬁrst phase would be to liberalize the movement of 
goods, people and capital through FTAs; the second phase to create a 
customs union with common external tariff system; and the third phase 
to integrate the different economic systems and adopt a single currency. 
Interestingly, the report also included a section on domestic measures 
such as the need to set up a Cabinet Ministerial Meeting on East Asian 
Policy and open up agricultural markets. The collective effort of Japan's 
epistemic policy actors to identify and state what Japan's stance should 
be is commendable and helpful, especially when the ofﬁcial response 
appears less than clear. 
AI and NEAT are the two most signiﬁcant track 2 regional networks 
in East Asia, primarily because of their close links with ofﬁcial bodies.32 
They play a role in promoting and inﬂuencing regionalist projects pur-
sued by state actors. Through robust policy recommendations, adapta-
tions and the ability to analyze and foresee various effects and implica-
tions, they seek to collectively inﬂuence the direction and depth of state 
regionalism. There is, thus, a dynamic interaction between epistemic 
policy actors on one level and state actors on the other. 
The cross-level interaction has at times been constructive and led to 
positive regionalism but at other times been contradicting and non-
inﬂuential. AI's role in inﬂuencing the formation of ARF exempliﬁes 
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positive regionalism. The fact that the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) 
consists largely of track 2 epistemic policy actors is another example of 
constructive inﬂuence, in which their report provided the blueprint for 
East Asian cooperation with many of the recommendations adopted by 
the track 1 EASG. Apart from the direct approach of producing policy 
recommendation reports, the idea of organizing conferences and forums 
such as the APR, EAC and the East Asia Forum (EAF) allowed epistemic 
policy actors to constructively engage state actors and push forward 
certain policy agendas. These are venues to enlighten policymakers 
on how epistemic communities view region-building, and what some 
of the enduring problems are that need to be tackled, as well as to re-
ceive feedback to gauge the ongoing progress of the regionalist project. 
However, contradictions do arise, an example of which is AI's concerns 
going unheeded when ASEAN insisted on the accession of Myanmar. 
At times, policy recommendations can be non-inﬂuential when they 
are vague, wide-ranging or impractical. NEAT has submitted their 
policy recommendations to the APT Senior Ofﬁcial Meeting on several 
occasions but they have not produced any tangible results. Nonethe-
less, this has not created negative effects strong enough to cause region 
deconstruction because the epistemic communities in general take on 
the role as supporters or advisers rather than challengers. This is due 
in part to their loose structure, close relationship with state actors and, 
in varying degrees, the self-imposition of track 1 sacred principles such 
as non-interference in internal affairs, which makes it harder to touch 
upon sensitive issues like institutionalization and areas of 'high politics' 
(Ruland 2002:90). 
Conclusion
This article was primarily concerned with explaining the process of 
cross-level actor interaction. It aimed to show the dynamic interplay of 
multiple regional actors that can consciously or unconsciously contribute 
to the strengthening or weakening of region construction. It stressed 
the multifaceted nature and complex processes that often transcend the 
formal and informal boundaries of regionalization.
Since the conclusion for each section has already been provided at 
the end of each section, they will not be repeated here. Sufﬁce to note 
that the various schemes and issues discussed above provide an under-




Largely, such interactions are contributing to higher levels of re-
gion-ness. Despite certain clauses that secure state interests, the BBC, 
AICO and AIA (including AFTA) are geared towards the facilitation 
and entrenchment of a wider East Asian production chain. This further 
strengthens economic regionalization, as the schemes provide incentives 
to Japanese, South Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese ﬁrms (though not 
necessarily exclusively) to increase their investments across the region. 
FTA proliferation is also a contributing factor. If only a few countries 
were interested in FTAs prior to the crisis, more and more countries in 
East Asia today are proactively engaging each other in FTAs. This has 
the effect of tying the region together and beneﬁting business opera-
tions by removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but only if it is done 
in a concerted manner, since bilateral FTAs could also have a negative 
effect by causing fragmentation, instead of integration. 
Equally, epistemic communities such as AI, NEAT and CEAC are, 
through their close cooperation with state actors, playing a crucial role 
in helping to create and promote greater awareness of East Asia as a 
connected and integrated region. The shaping and reshaping of the 
region are reﬂective of the constant interactions of, and idea sharing 
between, the multiple levels of actors. Policymakers look to scholars 
and researchers for ideas that do not only beneﬁt the region but are 
beneﬁcial in promoting the national interests of the member countries 
involved. In East Asia, policy recommendations from the academic com-
munity that are adopted by policymakers are often those that promote 
both national and regional collective interests or which are at least not 
adverse to the former. 
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NOTES
1  The term 'East Asia' encompasses both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
2  See Pempel (2005) for a more detailed discussion on the concept of regionalism and 
regionalisation in the context of East Asia.
3  For a historical timeline of Japanese automakers in ASEAN, see JAMA, 2005.
4  A similar idea was proposed by Ford in early 1970s to assemble a Ford 'Asian car' 
but was rejected at that time.
5  The participating states under the BBC were Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Due to domestic concerns, Indonesia joined the scheme only in 1994.
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6  Since the CEPT implementation would take time, the automakers could not enjoy 
immediate tariff reduction beneﬁts.
7  At the 31st AEM meeting in Singapore in 1999, trading companies involving SMEs 
only were allowed to participate in AICO.
8  By April 2005, 129 applications had been approved, with nearly 90 per cent from 
the automotive sector (ASEAN Secretariat 2005).
9  It was agreed that the TEL will be phased out by 2010 for all members, except Viet-
nam (by 2013) and Laos and Myanmar (by 2015). The AIA is to be realised by 2010 
for ASEAN investors and ten years later for foreign investors. Since joint ventures 
blur the lines between an ASEAN investor and a foreign investor in terms of equity 
share, the deﬁnition of an 'ASEAN investor' in this respect rests on the individual 
host country's domestic laws and investment policies.
10  Slight variations exist between countries in the privileges offered (See ASEAN Sec-
retariat 1998b). The 100 per cent foreign equity ownership privilege helps to explain 
the need to waive the 30 per cent equity in AICO.
11 This only applies to the ASEAN-6 countries. For the newer members, it will be 
2015.
12  However, having an upper hand may not be of much relevance considering the lib-
eralisation efforts that member countries have made for the manufacturing sector, 
resulting in strong foreign investor presence.
13  Personal communication with Denis Hew, 27 April 2004.
14  Figures for 1998 and 2003 exclude investment data on Cambodia.
15  Reyes, Romeo A. 2005. 'Are Jobs Being Created or Lost in AFTA?'. The Jakarta Post, 
31 May. 
16  Bangkok Post 2005. 'Open up FTA Talks to Wider Participation', 10 May.
17  FTA Watch Group 2004. 'Open Letter to the Government and the People of Australia', 
12 December. http://www.bilaterals.org/?open-letter-to-the-government-and Ac-
cessed 16 October 2014.
18  Na Thalang, Jeerawat 2004. 'Thai-Australia FTA: 1,500 Dairy Farmers to Protest'. The 
Nation. Bangkok, 18 June.
19  Cahiles-Magkilat, Bernie 2005. 'Trade Alliance Seeks Transparency on Japan-RP FTA 
Negotiations'. Manila Bulletin, 15 June.
20  Siripunyawit, Sriwipa 2005. 'Professions Brace for FTA Impact'. Bangkok Post, 13 
June. 
21  There are obviously many other private, semi-private and smaller research institutes 
in East Asia and the Asia Paciﬁc, which are involved in various research issues, but 
considering the focus on policy inﬂuence and limitation of the paper, discussions 
are centred on these two.
22  The ten institutes, of which the ﬁrst ﬁve are founding members, are: Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; Institute of Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA); 
Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; Institute for Strategic 
and Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines; Brunei Darussalam Institute of 
Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS); Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), 
Vietnam; Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP); and Institute of 
Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos.
23  ISIS Malaysia continues to host the APR as an annual event, but has done so on 
behalf of the AI since 1993. 
24  AI was not the only body pushing for multilateral security cooperation. Gorbachev 
was already broaching the idea of a regional security conference for the Asia Paciﬁc 
area similar to the CSCE in July 1986 and again in 1988. Other governments followed 
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suit, with Australia proposing an Asian version of the CSCE in 1990, followed by 
Canada and Japan. ASEAN, fearful of marginalisation and outside interference, 
resisted attempts to base any security framework on the European experience and 
instead pressed for a forum based on the norms/principles of the organisation 
(Buszynski 1999).
25  Since the ARF includes other countries from the Asia Paciﬁc area apart from ASEAN, 
it was deemed necessary to establish a wider track 2 network known as the Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Paciﬁc (CSCAP) to provide a structured proc-
ess on Asia Paciﬁc security matters. Set up in 1993 with AI as one of the founding 
members and a secretariat located in ISIS Malaysia, CSCAP serves as the main track 
2 process for the ARF.
26  The HLTF is made up of permanent secretaries and Directors-General of Ministries 
of Trade and Industry and was set up by the ASEAN Economic Ministers at their 
34th meeting in September 2002.
27  Personal communication, 27 April 2004.
28  The six WGs are: Promoting East Asian Economic Integration by Solving the New 
Global Imbalance and The Overall Architecture of Community Building in East Asia 
hosted by Japan; Concepts, Ideas and Empowering Guidelines for East Asia hosted 
by Malaysia; Energy Security Cooperation in East Asia hosted by Singapore; and 
East Asian Financial Cooperation and East Asian Investment Cooperation hosted 
by China.
29  The CEAC consists of representatives from government agencies, 12 think tanks, 14 
corporate members and 63 individual members.
30  JFIR's policy recommendations are based on an elite-democratic system that requires 
majority approval before it becomes ofﬁcial and is presented to the Prime Minister 
of Japan.
31  The CEAC policy report was approved by 58 members and represents the Japanese 
epistemic community's position for consideration at the 3rd NEAT conference.
32  There are also other regional networks such as the East Asian Development Net-
work (EADN) and Global Development Network (GDN) Japan, which are part of 
an international network – the GDN – but their aim is to promote research capacity 
building and knowledge dissemination.
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